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Abstract
We study how the diffusion of being pivotal affects immoral outcomes. In a first
set of experiments, subjects decide about agreeing to kill mice and receiving money
versus objecting to kill mice and foregoing the monetary amount. In a baseline
condition, subjects decide individually about the life of one mouse. In the main
treatment, subjects are organized into groups of eight and decide simultaneously.
Eight mice are killed if at least one subject supports the killing. The fraction of
subjects agreeing to kill is significantly higher in the main condition compared to
the baseline condition. In the second set of experiments, we run the same baseline
and main conditions but use a charity context and additionally study sequential
decisions. We replicate our main finding from the mouse paradigm and additionally
show that in the sequential treatment, prosocial behavior is even less pronounced.
We further show that the observed effects increase with experience, i.e., when we
repeat the experiment for a second time. Finally, we report evidence on beliefs,
elicited in our main experiments but also from a treatment of noninvolved observers,
and show that beliefs about being pivotal are a main driver of our results.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how groups favor moral transgression in diffusing responsibility and
notions of being pivotal. Intuitively, acting in groups provides an excuse for acting
immorally simply because an individual may perceive himself as not or only partly re-
sponsible for promoting a particular outcome. A striking example is the practice of firing
squads, which typically consist of a group of executors rather than a single person. From
an individual member’s perspective, being pivotal is diffused, as many people shooting
at the same time implies that the killing is likely to happen, regardless of whether a
particular member does or does not fire his gun. Moreover, members of firing squads are
often randomly issued a gun containing a blank cartridge. This additionally diffuses be-
ing pivotal: Even if a member of the squad shoots his gun, he remains uncertain whether
he can effectively cause the killing at all. Apparently, these features reduce feelings of
responsibility and hence facilitate participating in executions.
To investigate the consequences of group settings which diffuse being pivotal, we ran
two sets of experiments varying the choice environment and contrast environments where
subjects are fully pivotal with contexts where being pivotal is exogenously diffused. In
the latter, subjects are organized into groups and individual decisions are aggregated
such that the individual can easily believe that his decision is unlikely to be pivotal.
Organizing people into groups and implementing a decision rule that does not require the
support of all members for immoral action enables a simple “replacement logic” (Sobel
2010). It allows each single actor to believe that even if he does not agree to engage in
a morally questionable activity, others will, arguing that the immoral outcome happens
anyway. This diffusion of being pivotal is pervasive at various levels of social interaction,
such as firms, organizations, and markets.
We study two different choice paradigms. In the first set of experiments, the paradigm
involves the trade-off between life and money. Subjects decide between receiving money
and agreeing to kill mice versus not receiving money and objecting to the killing.1 Im-
portantly, mice used in the experiment are so-called “surplus” mice, which would have all
1. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Bonn.
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been killed without our intervention (see Section 2). Subjects learn about this default in
a post-experimental debriefing. The paradigm is informed by the widely-held view that
harming others in an unjustified and intentional way is considered immoral. While there
exists no universal consensus about how to define the content of morality, avoiding and
preventing harm is a central element according to most notions of morality.2 We contrast
two treatments: Baseline implements a simple binary choice where subjects either receive
e0 for saving a mouse (Option A) or e10 for killing the mouse (Option B). In Baseline,
subjects are hence fully pivotal. This condition serves as a comparison benchmark for
the main treatment (Simultaneous). In the latter, eight subjects simultaneously decide
between Option A and Option B. As in Baseline, a subject receives no money for choosing
Option A and e10 for choosing Option B, irrespective of the other subjects’ choices. If
at least one subject chooses Option B, however, eight mice are killed. Thus, if a subject
believes that at least one other subject is likely to choose Option B, he may no longer
consider himself pivotal. From a utilitarian perspective, a low chance of being pivotal
provides an excuse to choose Option B, as choosing Option B is unlikely to change the
outcome but guarantees a payoff of e10. In line with this argument, we find that the
fraction of subjects choosing Option B is significantly higher in Simultaneous than in
Baseline, despite the fact that – upon being pivotal – killing causes the death of eight
mice rather than one mouse. Moreover, the likelihood that a subject chooses to kill mice
is decreasing in his belief of being pivotal. At the aggregate level, all mice are killed in
Simultaneous.
Our second choice paradigm involves the binary decision to either keep money for
oneself or to donate a higher amount to a charity. In particular, subjects choose between
receiving e10 or donating e15 to a charity that supports children suffering from cancer.
The purpose of this second set of experiments is three-fold. First, we study whether
our main finding from the first experiment replicates using a different choice paradigm.
Second, we additionally study a dynamic setting of diffusion of responsibility, i.e., a
2. See, e.g., Gert (2012, Section 1) on “The Definition of Morality,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: “In this descriptive sense, although avoiding and preventing harm is common to all, ‘moral-
ity’ can refer to codes of conduct of different societies with widely differing content, and still be used
unambiguously.”
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context where decisions are not made simultaneously but sequentially. The latter is
particularly relevant in light of many real-world applications where people operate in
a line of action, observing previous choices but being uncertain how individuals down
the line will decide. Finally, we investigate experience effects, i.e., whether the observed
effects get larger if subjects repeat the same experiment one more time.
We ran three treatment conditions. Besides using a different choice paradigm, these
conditions are as similar as possible to the mouse conditions (including wording of the
instructions, framing of decisions in terms of Option A vs. Option B, etc.). In Base-
lineC, (C for charity) subjects either donate e15 (Option A) or keep e10 for themselves
(Option B). In this condition, subjects are fully pivotal. In SimultaneousC, a group of
eight subjects is endowed with e120 (8 × e15, analogously to the mouse condition). As
in Simultaneous, subjects simultaneously decide to either donate or to keep the money.
Choosing Option A implies no additional earnings while Option B guarantees e10, irre-
spective of the decisions of others. If, however, at least one of the group members chooses
Option B, the whole donation is “destroyed,” i.e., subjects are pivotal only if all other
group members choose to donate. In SequentialC, the decision context is exactly as in
SimultaneousC, but subjects choose sequentially. The position is randomly determined
such that one subject moves first, another second and so on, up to position 8. Every
subject is informed about the previous choice history, i.e., he learns his position and
how many subjects have previously chosen Option A or Option B, respectively. Unless
Option B has already been chosen, this set-up creates diffusion of responsibility for a
subject considering to choose Option A because it remains unclear what outcome will
materialize, given that there is a line of others who might still choose Option B. This
treatment delivers additional insights. For example, an individual’s choice may not only
depend on expectations about behavior down the line but could also be affected by social
learning depending on previous choices. All three treatments using the charity paradigm
involve an identical second round, which comes at a surprise to subjects. The rationale
for repetition is that, in contrast to BaselineC, many subjects in the first round of the
group treatments may hold mistaken beliefs about their chance of being pivotal. Learn-
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ing the outcome of the first round was therefore expected to affect behavior in the group
treatments but not in BaselineC. Repeating choices provides useful additional informa-
tion about the role of groups and about the implied diffusion of responsibility relative to
choice contexts where individuals are fully pivotal.
The charity experiment replicates the main effect from the mouse conditions. The
share of subjects choosing the selfish Option B is significantly higher in both group
conditions than in the baseline treatment. Moreover, choosing a second time in BaselineC
does on average not affect the likelihood of donations but – as expected – induces more
selfish choices in both SimultaneousC and SequentialC. In the latter, we additionally find
that previous history matters for behavior. In particular, learning that Option B has
already been chosen basically eradicates the choice of Option A further down the line.
In this respect it is intuitive that the choice of the first group member (position 1) is
greatly affecting group behavior and explains why subjects in this role display a similar
likelihood of choosing Option A as in BaselineC.
Perceptions of being pivotal are central to the mechanism under study and hinge
critically on beliefs about the behavior of others. This is why, in both experiments, we
elicit beliefs and confirm that choices are strongly associated with the perceived likelihood
of being pivotal. A potential concern in eliciting beliefs of active players, however, is that
stated beliefs may be used to “justify” behavior (Epley and Gilovich 2016; Gino, Norton,
and Weber 2016). This may pollute findings even when beliefs are incentivized, as is
the case in our experiment. Given the critical role of beliefs, we therefore ran a further
experiment with noninvolved subjects. In this condition subjects read the instructions
of all three treatments implemented with the Charity paradigm and are asked to predict
the results from those experiments. They are paid for accuracy. These independently
elicited beliefs of spectators corroborate our above-mentioned findings. In particular, we
find that beliefs of spectators are very similar to those of subjects actually making a
decision.
Taken together, the results from both the mouse and the charity paradigm show that
an exogenously imposed diffusion of being pivotal facilitates moral transgression. In
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particular, they show the power of organizational design to causally promote immoral
behavior and outcomes. Our findings thus contribute to the understanding of the sources
of malleability of moral behavior and of why “ordinary” people endowed with given moral
values may engage in activities they would generally object to.
Our paper is related to work on contextual factors affecting fair outcomes in the con-
text of simple dictator, bargaining, or allocation games. While we focus on the role of
beliefs about being pivotal, other mechanisms that have been identified to favor “unfair”
outcomes are delegation or exploiting moral “wriggle rooms,” as discussed, e.g., in Bartling
and Fischbacher (2012), Hamman, Loewenstein, and Weber (2010), and Dana, Weber,
and Kuang (2007).3 Falk and Szech (2013) analyze malleability of moral outcomes in
bilateral and multilateral market situations and Falk (2017) studies the role of status in-
equality. Another related literature in social psychology concerns the so-called bystander
effect (see, e.g., Latané and Darley 1968, and for a recent overview Fischer et al. 2011).
Typical bystander experiments study helping behavior in response to a staged emergency
(e.g., the experimenter becomes injured). What sets our simultaneous treatments apart
is that even if a subject opts for the moral outcome, he remains uncertain about whether
the moral outcome is implemented or not, similar, e.g., to firing squads. In bystander
experiments on the other hand this uncertainty does not exist. If a subject opts for help-
ing, the person in need receives help. Furthermore, in a typical bystander experiment,
while deliberating about helping or not, subjects observe that others do not help either.
In our simultaneous-move set-up, this type of social learning is ruled out. When decid-
ing to kill a mouse or not to donate, respectively, subjects do not know whether other
subjects opt for the selfish option as well. The dynamic properties of observing others,
however, are explicitly studied in our sequential treatment. In addition, in a bystander
experiment, participants need to realize that their help is required (and that it is better
to step in than to hope that some other, say, more able helper will step in), while in our
set-up, consequences of decisions are straightforward. Note also that in our experiment,
consequences are real, incentives are exactly specified, and the mechanism (beliefs about
3. On the effects of institutions on values, see also Bowles (1998). On the role of authority, see Milgram
(2009) [1974].
5
being pivotal) is explicitly measured.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research
paradigms, treatments, procedural details, and hypotheses. Results are presented in
Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Design and Hypotheses
In this section, we first discuss and motivate the mouse experiment, including the
paradigm, treatments, and procedural details. We then present the charity experiment,
which was run to check replicability of our findings from the mouse experiment, to study
sequential in addition to simultaneous decision-making, and to investigate the role of ex-
perience. Next, we describe the experiment on uninvolved subjects, run to elicit unbiased
beliefs about being pivotal. Finally, we state our hypotheses.
2.1 Mouse experiment
Avoiding and preventing unjustified harm is central to most notions of morality. It is
this notion that informs our “mouse paradigm,” which involves the trade-off between
killing a mouse and receiving money versus saving a mouse life and receiving no money
(Falk and Szech 2013).4 Subjects are explicitly informed that each mouse is a young and
healthy mouse, which will live for about two years if saved. For illustrative purposes, we
present subjects the picture of a mouse on an instruction screen. We guarantee subjects
that mice, if saved, live in an appropriate, enriched environment, jointly with a few
other mice. Hence, in case subjects decided to save mice, these mice were kept alive in
an enriched environment, with good feed and comfortable nesting material, precisely as
stated in the instructions.
4. Deckers et al. (2016) provide convergent and discriminatory validity of the mouse paradigm as a
measure for morality. Killing is negatively related to agreeableness, one of the Big Five facets, which de-
scribes a tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic towards
others, and positively related to Machiavellianism, measuring a person’s tendency to be unemotional, and
detached from conventional morality. Moreover, killing is not related to disposable income, whether stu-
dents are professionally involved with animal research or animal experiments or have a simple preference
for animals, as expressed by having a pet at home.
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Subjects are also informed in detail about the killing process. In the instructions,
they read the following passage: “The mouse is gassed. The gas flows slowly into the
hermetically sealed cage. The gas leads to breathing arrest. At the point at which the
mouse is not visibly breathing anymore, it remains in the cage for another 10 minutes.
It will then be removed.” To further rule out uncertainty about the decision context,
subjects are shown a short demonstration video of the killing process. In the video, four
mice first move vividly in the cage, then they successively slow down as more and more
gas enters the cage. Eventually they die, with their hearts beating visibly heavy and
slow.
It is important to stress that the mice used in the experiment were so-called “surplus”
mice: These mice were bred for animal experiments, but turned out to be unsuited for
scientific research. They were perfectly healthy, but keeping them alive would have been
costly. It is common practice in laboratories conducting animal experiments to gas such
mice. Thus, as a consequence of our experiment, many mice that would otherwise all
have died were saved. Subjects were informed about this default in a post-experimental
debriefing.5
Mouse treatments. We study the role of diffusion of being pivotal in contrasting two
decision environments, one where subjects are fully pivotal (Baseline) and one where being
pivotal is diffused by organizing subjects into groups (Simultaneous). The two decision
contexts differ in how likely it is that any given subject is pivotal, keeping overall moral
and financial consequences identical. In Baseline, each subject decides about the life of
one mouse. Subjects face a simple binary choice between Option A and Option B. Option
A implies that the mouse will survive and that the subject receives no money. Option
B implies the killing of the mouse and receiving e10. The Baseline treatment informs
us about the share of subjects who are willing to kill the mouse for e10 when obviously
being pivotal.
5. While perceptions of the situation may have changed due to this information, consequences were
exactly the same and as stated in the instructions. In future research, it would be interesting to explore
whether using an alternative framing would affect decisions in response to institutional changes differently
(compare evidence on the so-called omission-commission bias, e.g., in Spranca, Minsk, and Baron 1991).
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In Simultaneous, subjects decide in groups of eight and are endowed with eight mice.
As in Baseline, each subject faces an individual binary choice between Option A and
Option B. Option A implies that a subject receives no money. If a subject choses Option
B, he receives e10. Individual monetary consequences are independent of other subjects’
decisions. All subjects choose simultaneously. They know that if at least one subject
chooses Option B, all eight mice are killed. Furthermore, they know that they will not
receive feedback on whether the mice are finally killed or not (though it is obvious for
a subject that the mice die if he chooses Option B). Note that we chose to endow a
group with eight mice to keep the number of mice at the aggregate level identical to
Baseline. Of course we do not know whether the valuation of mice lives is proportional
to the number of saved mice, but keeping numbers identical at the aggregate level allows
for a clean comparison of the overall impact of group vs. individual decision making.
From an individual perspective, however, we could also have endowed groups with only
one mouse. In this case, an individual considering himself as being pivotal would have
faced the exact same consequences in Baseline and Simultaneous. Under the plausible
assumption that subjects value eight mice lives at least as much as one mouse life, our
treatment comparison is therefore conservative, in the sense of biasing against finding
treatment effects.
In Simultaneous, right after subjects have made their decision, we elicit beliefs about
being pivotal. Subjects are asked to estimate how many other subjects in their group have
chosen Option B. They can enter any number from 0 to 7 and are paid e1 for a correct
estimate (belief_B). We also ask subjects to indicate the probability that all other seven
group members have chosen Option A. Subjects are asked to enter an integer percentage
number, i.e., higher percentages indicate a higher perceived likelihood of being pivotal
(belief_pivotal). Both types of beliefs (belief_B and belief_pivotal) are significantly
correlated (Spearman rank correlation: −0.63, p < 0.001).
Mouse procedures. 252 subjects, mainly undergraduate university students from all
majors, took part in the experiment, 124 subjects in Baseline and 128 in Simultaneous.
Each subject participated only in one treatment condition. We used z-Tree as the exper-
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imental software (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE
(Greiner 2004). At the beginning of an experimental session, participants received de-
tailed information about the rules and the structure of the experiment. In all treatments,
the experiment started only after all participants had answered several control questions
correctly.
To reduce possible communication between subjects across sessions, the experiment
was run on two consecutive days in six different rooms at the Beethovenhalle, the largest
concert hall in Bonn. We set up six parallel, computerized labs in these rooms. Subjects
received payments according to the rules of the experiment and an additional show-up fee
of e20 to compensate for the remote location. In both treatments, subjects received their
payments in a sealed envelope outside the room where the experiment had taken place.
This way, neither other subjects nor the experimenters handing over the envelopes knew
what a particular subject had earned. This procedure was explained in the instructions.
To ensure credibility, we stated right at the beginning that all statements made in the
instructions were true, as is standard in economic experiments, and that all consequences
of subjects’ decisions would be implemented exactly as described in the instructions. We
emphasized orally that the experimenters personally guarantee for the truthfulness of the
instructions. Subjects were also invited to send us an email if they wanted to discuss the
study.
2.2 Charity experiment
The charity treatments are essentially the same as in the mouse experiment, except that
we use a different choice paradigm and study the role of experience as well as an additional
sequential condition. As far as possible, we use the same design features, stake sizes (e10
for the selfish option), and wording and framing of choice options. At the beginning of
the experiment, subjects are made familiar with the charity, which is devoted to support
children who suffer from cancer. In particular, the charity is engaged in psychological
assistance and in organizing leisure activities for children and their families, helps with
follow-up care and school-related issues, and supports parents and siblings as well as
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clinical research on cancer.
Charity treatments. To check replicability of our experimental results from the mouse
paradigm, we study a baseline (BaselineC) and a simultaneous group condition (Simul-
taneousC), analogously to the mouse conditions. In BaselineC, subjects make the binary
decision to either donate e15 (Option A) or to keep e10 for themselves (Option B).6 In
SimultaneousC, subjects are in groups of eight and simultaneously choose either Option A
or Option B, respectively. Choosing Option B implies receiving e10 and choosing Option
A receiving no money, irrespective of the choices of other group members. A donation of
e120 (8 × e15) is initiated for the charity only if all group members choose Option A.
If one group member or more choose(s) Option B, the donation of e120 is destroyed. To
study how a dynamic setting affects diffusion of responsibility, we further run treatment
SequentialC. This treatment is identical to SimultaneousC (including payments, dona-
tion, wording, etc.), except that subjects choose sequentially. It is randomly determined
at which position a subject is asked to decide, one subject being first, another second, up
to position 8. Prior to making the binary decision (Option A or Option B), subjects are
informed about their position (1 to 8) and about the previous choice history, i.e., how
many subjects have previously chosen A and how many have opted for B.
In both SimultaneousC and SequentialC, we also elicit beliefs analogously to Simulta-
neous in the mouse condition. Subjects are asked to estimate how many other subjects in
their group have chosen Option B, with possible responses from 0 to 7 (belief_B). Correct
answers are remunerated with e2. We also ask subjects to indicate the probability that all
other seven group members have chosen Option A. Responses are given in percent using
a slider, with higher percentages reflecting a higher perceived likelihood of being pivotal
for the respective subject (belief_pivotal). Again, both types of beliefs (belief_B and
belief_pivotal) are significantly correlated (Spearman rank correlation: −0.35, p < 0.001
for SimultaneousC and −0.65, p < 0.001 for SequenticalC).7
6. Note that the design choice to donate e15 limits the plausibility of the argument that the e10 kept
are spent on an alternative good cause.
7. Beliefs are elicited in the same way in SimultaneousC and SequentialC, but we note that in the
latter, beliefs will depend on position and responses are affected by previous play, e.g., getting to know
that Option B has already been chosen.
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To measure potential experience effects, all three conditions include a second round,
which came to subjects as a surprise.8 Subjects were told that they will make one more
and final decision. In SimultaneousC and SequentialC, subjects learn whether at least
one subject in their group has chosen Option B and thereby destroyed the donation, and
that they will make the same decision in the same group of eight, as in the first round.
In SequentialC, they also know that they act in the exact same order, i.e., each subject
chooses at the same position as before. Payoffs and consequences are identical to the first
round.
Charity procedures. 481 subjects, mainly undergraduate university students from all
majors, took part in the experiments, 121 subjects in BaselineC, 120 in SimultaneousC
and 240 in SequentialC (30 groups). Each subject participated only in one treatment
condition. We used oTree as experimental software (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016).
Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). At the beginning
of an experimental session, participants received detailed information about the rules
and structure of the experiment. In all treatments, the experiment started only after all
participants had answered several control questions correctly. The experiments were run
at the BonnEconLab in March 2017. Subjects received a show-up fee of e10.
2.3 Belief experiment
A possible concern in interpreting beliefs is the potential endogeneity of beliefs due to
motivated reasoning (Epley and Gilovich 2016; Gino, Norton, and Weber 2016). Eliciting
and interpreting beliefs is notoriously difficult in this respect. To limit the problem, we
incentivized beliefs about the number of other participants choosing Option B in the
mouse and charity treatments, such that subjects could earn additional money for good
estimates. However, to get an estimate of beliefs that is not biased in terms of justifying
an action, we also ran an additional belief experiment. By comparing outcomes from
8. Of our 121 subjects who took part in BaselineC, only 79 took part in an experience condition, i.e.,
in a second round. For the first two sessions (with 42 subjects) we only ran one round. In the analysis,
we therefore either use 121 observations (round 1) or 79 observations (round 2), respectively.
11
this experiment to beliefs elicited in the charity treatments, we can check whether or
not beliefs in the latter are actually distorted. In the belief experiment, participants
read the original instructions of BaselineC, SimultaneousC, and SequentialC (avoiding
redundancies) and are then asked to answer questions on the respective treatments.
In both SimultaneousCB and SequentialCB (B for belief) we elicit the belief that
a subject is in a group in which all other seven group members choose Option A (be-
lief_pivotal). In addition we ask, assuming a group of eight, how many of the other
seven group members choose Option B (belief_B). In answering the latter question for
SequentialCB, subjects are asked to assume that they are the first mover.9
If the percentage answer (belief_pivotal) was correct within an interval of plus/minus
five percentage points, subjects received e2. Likewise, if they estimated the correct num-
ber (belief_B), they received e2.10 87 subjects participated in this condition, which was
programmed with oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016) and run at the BonnEcon-
Lab in March 2017.
2.4 Hypotheses
We expect that beliefs about the likelihood of being pivotal are crucial for morally relevant
behavior. If the perceived likelihood of being pivotal is small enough, subjects will find
it legitimate to opt for the morally problematic Option B. This replacement logic (Sobel
2010) can thus lead to a higher share of subjects opting to kill in the group treatments
compared to Baseline, in which subjects know that they are pivotal for sure.
To fix ideas, suppose subjects value receiving e10 as u > 0 and attach zero utility to
receiving e0. There is a moral cost of choosing Option B, c(n) > 0, where n indicates
the group size, and thus, in terms of consequences, either the killing of n = 1 vs. n = 8
mice or destroying a donation of either 1 × e15 vs. 8 × e15 = e120, respectively. The
expected disutility of killing n mice or destroying a donation of n × e15 depends on the
9. This choice was made because uncertainty about all other seven group members’ behavior only
exists for the subject who moves first.
10. We also asked a set of position-dependent questions which we are not discussing further. Maximum
earnings were e24 (twelve questions which were incentivized with e2 and one hypothetical question:
“what would you choose. . . ”) plus a show-up fee of e5.
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perceived likelihood of being pivotal, p(n), where p(1) = 1 while p(8) ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming
additivity of the arguments, it immediately follows that subjects choose Option B if
u− p(n) c(n) > 0 and Option A otherwise.
We first note that the believed likelihood of being pivotal, p(n), plays a crucial role
for willingness to opt for the morally problematic Option B in the group contexts. In
particular, Option B gives a higher utility under n = 8 than under n = 1 if and only if
p(8) < c(1) /c(8). This implies the following dichotomy result.
Belief-dependent dichotomy. Assume that c(1) < c(8). Then, the following dichotomy
holds.
(i) For p(8) small enough, opting for the morally problematic Option B becomes more
attractive in the group contexts than in Baseline.
(ii) For p(8) large enough, opting for the morally problematic Option B becomes less
attractive in the group contexts than in Baseline.
From this, we deduce our first Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Dichotomy). In the group contexts, subjects with a high belief of being
pivotal will less likely opt for the immoral Option B than subjects with a low belief of being
pivotal.
Further, if moral costs of agreeing to kill one versus eight mice are not that different,11
opting for B should become easier for subjects in the group contexts than in Baseline, for
a large range of beliefs of being pivotal, p(8) ∈ [0, a], a < 1.
Hypothesis 2 (Baseline vs. group contexts). More subjects will opt for B in the group
contexts than in Baseline.
Thus, in terms of treatment effects, we expect that there will be a substantial number
of subjects for whom u − p(8) c(8) > 0 > u − c(1), i.e., who choose Option A for n = 1
but prefer Option B for n = 8, reflecting a decrease in the perception of being pivotal
11. This seems rather plausible, compare Falk and Szech (2015) for individual willingness to kill one
versus two versus three mice, respectively.
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that exceeds the increase in moral consequences. Besides the notion of being pivotal, the
relative valuation of killing eight mice vs. one mouse (or destroying a larger rather than
a smaller donation, respectively) determines treatment differences. This implies that as
long as c(8) > c(1), we underestimate the role of being less pivotal in groups relative
to Baseline in the following sense. We could have endowed groups only with one mouse
or a donation of e15, respectively. In that case, we would expect even larger treatment
effects. We opted for eight mice (e120, respectively) in order to keep the maximum
possible extent of harm fixed at the aggregate level when comparing treatments.
In sum, smaller values of p(8) imply stronger incentives for immoral behavior in
groups, relative to the individual choice condition (Baseline). In addition, individual
heterogeneity in p(8) should translate into respective propensities to choose Option A
or B. Hence, we expect that, on average, Option B is chosen more often in the group
conditions than in Baseline, and that, at the individual level, the likelihood of choosing
Option B is inversely related to perceptions of being pivotal. For SequentialC, this also
implies that conditional on learning that Option B has already been chosen by another
group member, p(n) is zero, rendering Option B optimal. With respect to the repetition
of SimultaneousC (and SequentialC), we further expect that if subjects overestimate be-
ing pivotal in the first round, they will update p(n) downwards, yielding an increase in
the share of subjects choosing Option B in the second round.12 Since there is no such
updating happening in BaselineC, we predict a similar share of subjects choosing Option
B in rounds one and two.
The above arguments assume utilitarian reasoning. If, instead, a subject follows a
deontological moral principle (e.g., the Kantian Categorical Imperative), he will stick to
the morally preferred option, regardless of whether being pivotal is diffused or not. In
other words, some subjects may not respond to treatment differences, opting for Option
A even when p(n) is perceived as low. The empirical relevance of these two moral concep-
tions, which have been the main combatants in occidental moral philosophy for the last
12. We thus assume here that equilibrium does not emerge directly, i.e., subjects may hold incorrect,
heterogeneous beliefs, specifically in the first round of group decisions. For an equilibrium analysis of
group decisions in morally relevant contexts, see Rothenhäusler, Schweizer, and Szech (2017).
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centuries, has been empirically studied using the so-called trolley problem put forward
by Philippa Foot (see also, e.g., Greene et al. 2004; Thomson 1976).13 Evidence from
this literature suggests that both moral approaches are empirically relevant and that the
extent to which people follow the one or the other largely depends on situational and
emotional factors (e.g., framing the trolley problem as footbridge problem, which assigns
actors a more active role, leads to more rule based behaviors). Yet in contrast to the
Trolley evidence, which is using hypothetical outcomes, subjects in our experiments face
real consequences. Moreover, they weigh a selfish benefit against a morally problematic
outcome for third parties.
3 Results
We start in reporting our findings from the mouse experiment, before showing the results
from the charity and the belief experiment.
3.1 Mouse results
Our main result from the mouse experiment is shown in Figure 1, where we compare
the shares of subjects choosing to kill in Baseline and Simultaneous, respectively. In
Baseline, 46.0 percent of subjects choose Option B. In Simultaneous the respective share
is 58.6 percent, a difference of about 27 percent. This difference is significant (p < 0.05,
two-sample test of proportions, two-sided). At the aggregate level, the group impact is
striking. While in Baseline, 46 percent of mice are killed, all mice are killed in all groups
in Simultaneous. It trivially follows that on top of being more pronounced, killing is also
more “efficient” in Simultaneous: The average amount of money needed to kill a mouse
is e10 in Baseline but only e5.86 in Simultaneous.14
Our results show that simple organizational rules can have a big effect on moral
13. The quandary to be resolved in this problem is to either follow the deontologically warranted option
(and not to throw a switch that will divert a trolley and kill one person) or the option preferred from a
consequentialist perspective (killing the person to save five others).
14. In other words, in Simultaneous it is possible to kill eight mice paying less than e80 (which would
be needed in Baseline) since not all members choose to kill and yet, in the end, all mice are in fact killed.
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outcomes. Put differently, an organization pursuing the goal of promoting socially re-
sponsible outcomes, should avoid delegating responsibility to groups where the support
of only the “worst” member(s) is sufficient for selecting the immoral choice. Instead, it





























Figure 1: Share of subjects choosing Option B in Baseline and Simultaneous. Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation using heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors.
We have argued above that individual perceptions of being pivotal are critical in
driving the increase in selfish behavior in Simultaneous. Accordingly, we should observe
that an individual’s willingness to choose Option B decreases in his belief of being pivotal.
This is what we find. Recall that we asked subjects about the probability that all other
group members had chosen Option A (belief_pivotal). Figure 2 displays the fraction of
subjects choosing Option B depending on this belief. The four categories in Figure 2 are
based on quartiles of the belief distribution with respective percentage values of 0–3.5,
3.5–10, 10–35, and 35–100. The figure shows a clear negative relation between subjective
perceptions of being pivotal and the likelihood of choosing Option B (Spearman rank































Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Subjective belief of being pivotal
Figure 2: Share of subjects in Simultaneous choosing Option B depending on their belief
of being pivotal. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation using
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
OLS and probit regression results confirm the relationship between the belief of being
pivotal and the choice of Option B (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 1). The respective
coefficients are negative and significant. Assuming a linear relationship (column 1), the
coefficient implies that a ten percentage point increase in the perception of being pivotal
decreases the likelihood of killing mice by 8.4 percentage points. The importance of sub-
jective perceptions of being pivotal can also be inferred from results reported in columns
2 and 4. Here we use subjects’ responses to the question how many other subjects they
think have chosen Option B (belief_B). We construct a dummy which takes value 1 if a
subject stated the point belief that no other subject had chosen Option B, which would
have rendered the subject’s decision pivotal. 17 subjects (13.3 percent) stated this belief.
Among these 17 subjects, only one subject chose Option B. The negative and significant
coefficient of the dummy in column 2 implies that, relative to subjects with other point
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beliefs, the likelihood of choosing Option B is about 60.8 percentage points lower for
subjects who believe that they are pivotal.
Dependent variable: Option B
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
belief_pivotal -0.00840∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗
(0.00112) (0.00532)
belief_B = 0 -0.608∗∗∗ -1.995∗∗∗
(0.0731) (0.504)
Constant 0.791∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0451) (0.155) (0.124)
Observations 128 128 128 128
R2 0.273 0.175
AIC 145.1 161.3 140.0 152.9
Table 1: Coefficient estimates, with binary choice option (Option B: kill mice vs. Option
A: save mice) as dependent variable and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in
parentheses. Data come from the Simultaneous treatment. belief_pivotal is the belief
that all other group members have chosen Option A (in percent). belief_B = 0 is a
dummy based on belief_B which takes value 1 for the point belief that all other subjects
have chosen Option A. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
As briefly discussed above, notions of being pivotal provide an excuse only from an
outcome-based or utilitarian perspective. In this respect, it is noteworthy that in Simul-
taneous, about 18 percent of subjects who held the belief that the chance of being pivotal
is exactly zero chose Option A. From a utilitarian moral perspective, these subjects had
no reason not to choose Option B and cash in e10. Possibly, these subjects have followed
a deontological moral principle, sticking to their morally preferred option regardless of the
outcome. This suggests that, in line with survey-based evidence (trolley problem), there
is a co-existence of utilitarian and deontological moral conceptions, also in an incentivized
choice task. The fraction of Kantian subjects, however, appears to be low.
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3.2 Charity results
We now turn to our results based on the charity paradigm. The main findings are
summarized in Figure 3, which displays the share of subjects choosing Option B (not to
donate) in conditions BaselineC, SimultaneousC, and SequentialC, respectively. The dark
bars show results from the first round, the light bars those of the second round (which
was unexpected for subjects). Several observations can be made. First, we replicate the
main result from the mouse experiment using a different choice paradigm. The share of
subjects choosing Option B is significantly higher in SimultaneousC than in BaselineC
with means of 58.3 percent and 39.7 percent, respectively (p < 0.01, two-sample test of
proportions, two-sided). The increase in selfish behavior amounts to 47.0 percent, which
is higher than the respective increase in the mouse condition.
Second, we find that, on average, selfish behavior is also more pronounced in the
group setting where subjects choose sequentially rather than simultaneously. The overall
share of participants choosing Option B in SequentialC is 72.1 percent, an increase of 81.7
percent relative to BaselineC. The difference between the two treatments is statistically
significant (p < 0.01, two-sample test of proportions, two-sided).15 Hence, regardless of
whether choosing simultaneously or sequentially, groups diffuse being pivotal and favor
selfish behavior. At the aggregate level, no single group in SimultaneousC effectively
donated and only two out of the 30 groups in SequentialC did not destroy the donation
of e120. In Table 4 in Appendix C, we show regression results confirming these treatment
differences controlling for various personal characteristics such as gender, cognitive skills
(math grade) and personality (Big Five).
Third, the detrimental effects of group decision making on prosocial outcomes seem
to increase with experience. Comparing results between periods one and two reveals an
increase in the likelihood of immoral choices upon learning the previous outcome. The
increases in SimultaneousC and SequentialC amount to 12.5 and 14.2 percentage points,
respectively. These increases are statistically significant (p = 0.033 and p = 0.058, see
15. In running this test, for SequentialC we use the means of the 30 independent groups (of eight
subjects) as observations. The difference between SimultaneousC and SequentialC is not statistically

































Round 1 Round 2
Figure 3: Share of subjects choosing option B in BaselineC, SimultaneousC, and Se-
quentialC, per round. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation,
where standard errors are clustered on the group level for the second round of Simultane-
ousC and for both rounds of SequentiualC (395 clusters in total: 121 (BaselineC, round
1) + 79 (BaselineC, round 2) + 120 (SimultaneousC, round 1) + 15 (SimultaneousC,
round 2) + 30 (SequentialC, round 1) + 30 (SequentialC, round 2) = 395).
OLS estimates shown in column 1 of Table 5 in Appendix C). In sharp contrast, moral
behavior is not vulnerable to repetition in BaselineC, with an increase of Option B below
one percentage point.16
Analogously to the mouse experiment, we find that the association between the belief
about being pivotal and choosing Option B is negative and statistically significant for
both SimultaneousC and SequentialC. This relationship is shown for both treatments in
Figure 4 (panels A and B), where we display the share of subjects choosing Option B
depending on belief_pivotal and in Table 2, which is constructed analogously to Table
16. The latter finding suggests that, on average, subjects neither display notions of moral licensing
or moral cleansing nor of conscience accounting (see, e.g., Engel and Szech 2017; Gneezy, Imas, and
Madarász 2014; Monin and Miller 2001). We cannot rule out these effects, however. In fact, despite no
difference between rounds one and two on average, 12.7 percent of subjects switch from A to B and 12.7
percent switch from B to A.
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1. When we regress the likelihood of choosing Option B on the belief of being pivotal
as shown in Table 1 (columns 1 and 3), we get negative and significant coefficients of
−0.006 and −0.009, respectively. Hence, an increase in the perception of being pivotal
of ten percentage points reduces the likelihood of not donating by six percentage points
in SimultaneousC and by nine percentage points in SequentialC, similar to the effects
observed in the mouse condition. Columns 2 and 4 show this effect for belief_B. In
SimultaneousC, ten subjects (eight percent) stated the belief that no other subject had
chosen Option B. Thus, they assumed to be pivotal. Among these, only one subject chose
Option B. When we regress the choice of Option B in SimultaneousC on a dummy that
takes value 1 for those who state this belief, the respective coefficient implies that relative
to subjects with other point beliefs, the likelihood of choosing Option B is 53 percentage
points lower (column 2). We report a similar finding for SequentialC in column 4, with an
effect size of 77 percentage points. Finally, note that even among those in SimultaneousC
who believe they are not pivotal (estimated likelihood of being pivotal of zero percent),
18 percent (three out of 17) of subjects choose Option A, presumably reflecting a Kantian
kind of moral reasoning. Similarly, in SequentialC, of the 153 individuals for whom the
group donation was already destroyed before, eight subjects (5.2 percent) nevertheless
choose Option A and thus appear to follow a deontological moral rule.
As in BaselineC, we see switching in choices in both directions also in SimultaneousC
and SequentialC. There is, however, a higher likelihood of switching from Option A to
Option B: 11.7 percent in SimultaneousC and 7.9 percent in SequentialC, respectively,
change from choosing Option B to Option A. However, 24.2 and 22.1 percent, respectively,
switch from Option A to B. Intuitively, the prevalence of switching to the selfish option
should depend on subjects’ changes in beliefs about being pivotal. When we regress the
choice in round 2 on the choice in period 1 and the change in the belief about being
pivotal, there is a significant effect in the expected direction. Subjects who consider
themselves less pivotal in period 2 than in round 1 become more likely to choose Option
B in round 2 (see Table 6 in Appendix C).
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Subjective belief of being pivotal
(B) SequentialC
Figure 4: Share of subjects choosing Option B in the first round depending on the
belief of being pivotal in SimultaneousC (panel A) and SequentialC (panel B). Error bars
show 95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation using heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors, which for SequentialC are clustered at the group level.
are less likely to choose the morally desired action in SimultaneousC than in BaselineC,
and we observe a similar effect when subjects are choosing sequentially rather than si-
multaneously. In addition, we document that selfish outcomes in groups tend to increase
with experience in contrast to individual decisions. Beliefs about being pivotal seem to
be critical, both in a simultaneous and a sequential choice context, again very similar to
what we have seen in the mouse experiment.
We now turn to a closer inspection of the dynamics of decision making in SequentialC.
In contrast to the simultaneous choice context, participants in SequentialC know the
choice history up to the point where they make their decision. This means that they can
condition their choice on learning whether or not they are pivotal. Moreover, they act in
a chain, rendering the specific position in the chain potentially relevant.
In Table 3 we explore the role of position and choice history in a simple panel regression
framework using both rounds 1 and 2. In columns 1 and 4, we regress a participant’s
choice of Option B on his position. Not surprisingly, the respective coefficient is positive,
suggesting that as play evolves, a previous choice of Option B by another subject is
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Dependent variable: Option B
SimultaneousC SequentialC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
belief_pivotal -0.00574∗∗∗ -0.00879∗∗∗
(0.00134) (0.000547)
belief_B = 0 -0.527∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.0469)
Constant 0.774∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0465) (0.0183) (0.0337)
Observations 120 120 240 240
R2 0.139 0.087 0.448 0.400
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.080 0.446 0.397
Table 2: OLS regression coefficient estimates, with binary choice option (Option B:
destroy donation vs. Option A: donate) as dependent variable and heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors in parentheses (clustered on the group level for SequentialC).
Data come from round 1 of the SimultaneousC and SequentialC group treatments. be-
lief_pivotal is the perceived chance that all other group members choose Option A (in
percent) and belief_B = 0 is a binary variable being either 0 or taking the value 1 for
the point belief that all other group members choose Option A. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05;
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
getting increasingly likely. The effect is somewhat weaker in the second round (column
4), but we note that subjects are generally more likely to choose Option B in the second
round (as reflected by the higher constant). In columns 2 and 5, we regress Option
B on a dummy indicating that no other group member has yet chosen Option B (“not
destroyed”). Both in the first (column 2) and second round (column 5), subjects react
strongly to being potentially pivotal, reflected in the negative and significant coefficients.
The effect is weaker in round 2, consistent with the notion that subjects have learned
that the chance of being pivotal is actually quite low.
In columns 3 and 6 we combine position and history and also include the interaction
of the two. Turning to round 1 (column 3), both the coefficient for position as well as
the one for the interaction are insignificant, and the coefficient indicating that Option B
has not yet been chosen is basically identical in columns 2 and 3. This suggests that the
position itself plays a minor role. Instead, behavior is mainly determined by notions of
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being pivotal. In fact, the likelihood of choosing Option B given that at least one previous
group member has chosen Option B is 94.8 percent (see constant in column 2). The fact
that this is below 100 percent could either reflect lack of attention or understanding (which
is unlikely given the control questions and the prominent display of previous play on the
decision screen) or a non-utilitarian notion of rule based decision making. Interestingly,
the likelihood of choosing Option B conditional on learning that no other group member
has yet chosen Option B is only 32.2 percent (28 out of 87 subjects), which is actually less
than in BaselineC. In this respect, we note that a choice history consisting only of Option
A choices conveys two messages, an increased likelihood of being pivotal and a signal
about the prevalence of moral types in a given group. The latter can be interpreted as
social learning about existing social norms and may create some social pressure to comply
with this (evolved) norm.
Turning to round 2 in column 6, we see that experience has some effect on subjects’
behavior. During the first round (column 3), subjects react strongly to whether or not
there does still exist a chance of being pivotal. If any chance exists, they are less likely
to choose Option B but apparently do not take into account how large that chance
is, given their position in the decision line. With experience (column 6), subjects also
consider that, depending on their position, many subjects who decide down the line need
to comply in order to render their behavior pivotal. The positive interaction term in
column 6 suggests that subjects who decide later in the decision line, understand that
the chance of being pivotal, if still existent, is higher and thus are more likely to choose
Option A.
We conclude in specifically investigating behavior of participants choosing first, i.e.,
at position 1. These subjects face no choice history and therefore a similar situation as
subjects in SimultaneousC. Given that their behavior is observed down the line, however,
they know that choosing Option B renders all following seven group members’ decisions
non-pivotal, which may create a particularly strong “feeling of responsibility” or a desire to
act as a prosocial role model (Gächter et al. 2012; Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton 2013).
In fact, the share of the 30 first movers in SequentialC who choose Option B is only
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Dependent variable: Option B
Round 1 Round 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Position (1–8) 0.0552∗∗∗ -0.0121 0.0210∗ 0.00108
(0.0139) (0.0110) (0.0115) (0.00963)
Not destroyed -0.626∗∗∗ -0.607∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗ -0.154
(0.0626) (0.115) (0.122) (0.126)
Interaction -0.0170 -0.126∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0229)
Constant 0.473∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.968∗∗∗ 0.962∗∗∗
(0.0988) (0.0228) (0.0467) (0.0798) (0.0161) (0.0572)
Observations 240 240 240 240 240 240
R2 0.079 0.450 0.458 0.020 0.313 0.435
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.448 0.451 0.015 0.310 0.428
Table 3: OLS regression coefficient estimates, with binary choice option (Option B:
destroy donation vs. Option A: donate) as dependent variable. Data come from the
SequentialC treatment. Position is the position in the move order from 1–8, Not destroyed
is a dummy that is 1 if all subjects in the respective group have chosen Option A thus
far, and Interaction is the interaction of the two above variables. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the group level (30 groups). ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
43.3 percent which is lower than for SimultaneousC and not statistically different from
BaselineC where all subjects are fully pivotal (p = 0.71, two-sample test of proportions,
two-sided).17
3.3 Belief results
As pointed out above, stated beliefs in our main experiments are potentially polluted by
self-serving motives. These problems should be mitigated by the fact that we incentivized
the belief about the number of other players choosing B. However, given the critical role of
beliefs in understanding decision making in groups, we ran an additional belief treatment
with uninvolved spectators. The latter were incentivized to correctly estimate behavior
17. This holds despite the fact that first movers’ perceived percentage of being pivotal is only 31.3
percent, i.e., way below to what holds in BaselineC (100 percent). Note that for the 30 subjects who
decided on position 1 we also find that the belief of being pivotal and Option A are significantly correlated
in the expected direction (p < 0.001 for belief_pivotal and p < 0.001 for belief_B).
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in the charity experiments and had no incentive for stating self-serving beliefs.
The main purpose here is to check whether elicited beliefs are in fact biased. To this
end, we compare the beliefs of active subjects with those from spectators. In addition,
we compare beliefs to outcomes. Note that beliefs in SequentialC are more difficult to
interpret and less informative for the question at hand, given that beliefs depend on the
position and, in particular, on the choice history (e.g., rendering beliefs trivial in case
Option B has been chosen before). We therefore restrict this section to our simultaneous
treatments. If differences between beliefs from SimultaneousC and SimultaneousCB are
small, we will argue that self-serving motives are not seriously affecting our main findings.
Figure 5 shows results concerning belief_pivotal, i.e., the probability that a subject is
in a group with all other seven group members choosing Option A. The actual probability
was zero percent, both in rounds 1 and 2. In no single group, there were more than six
subjects choosing Option A. A different way to estimate the actual probability of being
pivotal is to use the whole distribution of choices and to calculate the likelihood – given
the probability for Option A (42 percent) – of randomly being matched with seven group
members who all choose Option A, which is 0.002. This value is shown in the first bar
and the analogous value of 0.0002 for round 2 in the second bar (the probability of Option
A in the latter round is 29 percent). Bars 3 and 4 show subjects’ beliefs for rounds 1
and 2 (in SimulatenousC), respectively. It is obvious that subjects heavily overestimate
how likely it is that they are pivotal. While the shown average beliefs hide a substantial
amount of heterogeneity, almost all subjects perceive themselves as being pivotal with
a higher likelihood than they actually are. Moving from round 1 to round 2, subjects
adjust in the correct direction but still heavily overestimate their impact.
These observations are interesting for several reasons. First, the negative effects of
groups are apparently smaller than they “should” be – if subjects were holding more
accurate beliefs. In other words, upon learning how unlikely it actually is for them
to be pivotal, we would expect the effects to be much larger. This intuition is in line
with the increased share of subjects choosing Option B in round 2 relative to round 1.
Second, overestimating one’s sense of being pivotal could point to a human tendency
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to overestimate one’s impact in general. This may well extend to other (non-moral)
contexts and seems worth further investigation, e.g., in voting contexts (Duffy and Tavits
2008). A possible reason for overestimating one’s impact could come from a desire for
meaning, self-attribution and determination, as well as for motivating action in general.18
Third, in terms of motivated reasoning, there is no indication that in the present context
subjects form self-servingly biased beliefs in an attempt to justify selfish behavior. This
is confirmed by a comparison with beliefs of the spectators (fifth bar). The relevant
beliefs are those from the first round, which are actually slightly higher than those of the
spectators. While this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.59, Mann–Whitney
U test, two sided) it suggests that, if anything, active subjects tend to overestimate the
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Figure 5: Likelihood of being pivotal, i.e. the probability that all other seven members
of a given subject’s group choose Option A (in percent). Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals from an OLS estimation, where standard errors are clustered for the second
round.
Qualitatively, we find very similar results concerning belief_B, i.e., the belief about
18. For a desire for efficacy, see research on the so-called IKEA-effect (e.g., Norton, Mochon, and Ariely
2012).
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how many of the other seven group members choose Option B. Figure 6 shows actual
numbers (for SimultaneousC) for rounds 1 and 2 (first two bars), beliefs in rounds 1 and
2 (bars 3 and 4), as well as beliefs of spectators (fifth bar). The number of subjects
choosing B increases from round 1 to 2, which is reflected in changes in the beliefs of
subjects. In contrast to belief_pivotal, however, subjects are overall much more accurate
about actual outcomes.19 Importantly, as for belief_pivotal, the beliefs of active subjects
and spectators are not statistically significantly different (comparison of bars 3 and 5 in





































Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Beliefs
held by
spectators
Figure 6: Number of other group members choosing Option B (0–7). Error bars show
95% confidence intervals from an OLS estimation, where standard errors are clustered
for the second round.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has documented the malleability of moral outcomes in response to an exoge-
nous diffusion of being pivotal. Simple organizational changes from an individual decision
19. A possible explanation is that subjects found answering the question concerning absolute numbers
easier than estimating a probability.
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context to group conditions increase moral transgression on the individual and even more
so on the aggregate level. Further, we have shown that low beliefs about being pivotal
lead to less moral behavior. Indeed, if beliefs about being pivotal had been more realistic,
the willingness to engage in selfish behavior may have been even more pronounced. In
this sense, it is conceivable that repeated interactions with learning possibilities increase
the likelihood of immoral outcomes even further, as we observe in the second round of
our experiment using the charity paradigm.
Our findings are largely in line with utilitarian moral thinking. Subjects consistently
respond to notions of being pivotal and only few subjects appear to follow a Kantian
conception. In Simultaneous, 18 percent of subjects who hold the belief that the chance
of being pivotal is exactly zero choose Option A. In SimultaneousC, the respective share
is again 18 percent. Finally, in SequentialC, of the 153 individuals for whom the group
donation was already destroyed before, eight subjects (5.2 percent) nevertheless choose
Option A. These numbers suggest the existence of deontological reasoning but they are
quite low.20 Our findings question the relatively high fractions of Kantian types in survey
data such as the Trolley problem, where consequences are hypothetical rather than real.
Replacement arguments help explaining outcomes in markets that are violating
traders’ own moral or fairness preferences (Sobel 2010). Here replacement prevails if
traders prefer concluding a trade themselves to letting another trader perform the same
transaction, even if trading creates unfair outcomes for traders themselves, or imposes
negative externalities on others. In cases where buying decisions create negative external-
ities, a frequently made “excuse” is that “if I don’t buy, another buyer will.” Conversely,
suppliers of potentially harmful goods might argue that market demand would be met
with or without their involvement. An argument along these lines was invoked by British
Secretary of State Boris Johnson in October 2016 after allegations about weapons ex-
ported to Saudi Arabia being used for war crimes in Yemen. Faced with a motion in
the House of Commons to suspend sales, he retorted that the respective members of
parliament should “be in no doubt that we would be vacating a space that would rapidly
20. Of course, it may also be the case that some subjects made mistakes.
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be filled by other Western countries who would happily supply arms with nothing like
the same compunctions or criteria or respect for humanitarian law” (Peck 2016; see also
Bartling and Özdemir 2017). This is a refined version of the discussed argument in point-
ing at positive “side effects” associated with Britain taking an active role (see Glover
and Scott-Taggart 1975, pp. 177). Yet we have shown increased moral transgression in a
context without any such subtleties. Thus, the latter might often represent mere excuses
rather than sound justifications.
While the focus of this paper is to highlight possible negative consequences of organi-
zational design on moral behavior, the reverse inference is of course our main interest. Our
findings suggest that organizations aiming at promoting morality should reduce diffusion
of being pivotal, and instead attribute individual responsibility to their members.
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Appendix A Instructions of Mouse Experiment
Instructions have been translated from German.
A.1 Baseline
Thank you very much for your participation!
For your participation you will in any case receive 20 euros. In the following you can earn
an additional amount of money. At the end of the experiment you will receive your money
in an envelope. Neither the other participants of the experiment nor the experimenter
will be able to see how much money you have earned.
Please note: Throughout the whole experiment communication between the par-
ticipants is not allowed. On the computer, please only use the functions intended
to be used. If you have questions please raise your hand. Your question will then be
answered at your cubicle!
Please note: All statements made in these instructions are true. This holds
for all experiments carried out by the BonnEconLab, and also for this experiment. In
particular, all actions to be taken will be implemented exactly in the way
they are described. If you want to, you will be able to verify the correctness of all
statements made in these instructions after the experiment.
In this experiment, there is a Quiz A and a Quiz B. Both, Quiz A and Quiz B, are
simple trivia quizzes with questions from history, geography, sports, and so on. One ex-
ample question could be: “Capital of Belgium?” There will, respectively, be four possible
answers out of which one answer is correct. The posed questions in Quiz A and Quiz B
are identical, that means, they are exactly the same regarding their difficulty. You will
get three minutes to solve the quiz. The more questions you solve correctly, the more you
can earn. For each question that is answered correctly, you receive 5 cents.
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A.1.1 Details on the mouse
In this study, the life of a mouse is entrusted to your care. It is a healthy, young mouse,
living with some other mice together in a small group. The expected lifetime of this
mouse is approximately two years.
A.1.2 What is the difference between Quiz A and Quiz B?
Quiz A: In Quiz A, at the end of the experiment, you earn no additional money besides
the 20 euros for participation and the mouse stays alive.
Quiz B: In Quiz B, at the end of the experiment, you get 10 euros in addition. As
another consequence, the mouse will get killed.
A.1.3 Details on the killing process
If you opt for the death of the mouse, the mouse is gassed. The gas flows slowly into the
hermetically sealed cage. The gas leads to breathing arrest. As soon as the mouse is not




In Quiz A you earn no additional money, and the mouse does not get killed. In Quiz B,
you earn additionally 10 euros, and the mouse gets killed. The decision is yours. You
make your decision on a decision screen that will be shown as soon as you have answered
the control questions on the following screen.
A.1.5 Control questions
In case of Quiz A: How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will a mouse be killed?  Yes  No
In case of Quiz B: How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will a mouse be killed?  Yes  No
A.2 Simultaneous
Introduction as in Baseline
In this study, the life of eight mice is entrusted to your group’s care. These are healthy,
young mice, living with some other mice together in a small group. The expected lifetime
of these mice is approximately two years.
A.2.1 What is the difference between Quiz A and Quiz B?
In the following we describe the consequences of choosing Quiz A and Quiz B. The choice
options and consequences are identical for all eight group members.
Quiz A: In Quiz A, at the end of the experiment, you earn no additional money besides
the 20 euros for participation. This holds for all group members. Each group member
who chooses Quiz A receives no additional money.
Quiz B: In Quiz B, at the end of the experiment, you get 10 euros in addition. This
holds for all group members. Each group member who chooses Quiz B receives 10 euros
in addition.
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Another consequence is that eight mice get killed if at least one member of your
group of eight chooses Quiz B. Thus if in total one member of the group, or two,
three, four, five, six, seven or eight group members choose Quiz B, eight mice get killed.
Only if no member in your group of eight chooses Quiz B, the mice will not
get killed.
A.2.2 Details on the killing process
If your group opts for the death of the mice, these will be gassed. The gas flows slowly
into the hermetically sealed cage. The gas leads to breathing arrest. As soon as the mice
are not visibly breathing anymore, they remain in the cage for another 10 minutes. They
will then be removed.
A.2.3 Summary
In Quiz A you earn no additional money. In Quiz B, you earn additionally 10 euros.
Whether the mice get killed depends on whether at least one member of your group of
eight has chosen Quiz B. You make your decision on a decision screen, which will be
shown as soon as you have answered the control questions on the following screen.
Control questions and video
Appendix B Instructions of Charity Paradigm
Instructions have been translated from German.
B.1 BaselineC
Welcome and thank you very much for your interest in today’s experiment!
This experiment is part of a research project of the Bonner Laboratorium für experi-
mentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (BonnEconLab).
For your participation you will in any case receive e10.00, which will be handed to
you in cash today at the end of the experiment. During the experiment, you will make
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decisions at the computer. Depending on how you decide, you can earn additional money.
During the experiment, it is not allowed to communicate with other partic-
ipants. Also note that the curtain of your cubicle has to be shut throughout
the entire experiment. Please now switch off your mobile phone, to make sure that
other participants are not being disturbed. On the computer, please only use the func-
tions intended to be used and make all inputs using either the mouse or the keyboard.
If you have questions, please contact the conductor of the experiment. To do so, please
stick your hand out of the cubicle.
All statements made in this experiment are true. This holds for all experiments
carried out by the BonnEconLab, and also for this experiment. In particular, all actions
to be taken will be implemented exactly in the way they are described. If you want to,
you will be able to verify the correctness of all statements made in these instructions after
the experiment.
In what follows, we will first ask you to answer a question regarding your mood.
Subsequently, the decisions you will have to make will be explained in detail.
B.1.1 How is your current mood?
Please give an answer to this on the following scale from 0 to 10.
0 means that your mood is very bad.
10 means that your mood is very good.
You can choose any integer number on the scale from 0 to 10 to express your current
mood.
B.1.2 The donation
This experiment is about a donation to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Ju-
gendliche e.V., a regional charity from Bonn.
Every participant, that means also you, will first be entrusted with a do-
nation which will be made to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und
Jugendliche e.V. after today’s experiment.
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During the experiment, you will make decisions which affect this donation. More-
over, the information which follow are also relevant for your personal payoff from this
experiment.
Therefore, please carefully read the following instructions. In particular, make sure
that you understand all decisions you can make as well as their potential consequences.
B.1.3 Information about the Förderkreis
The Förderkreis. The Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche e.V. sup-
ports young people suffering from cancer and their families comprehensively
in dealing with the disease. The society is committed to psychological support, to
organizing free time activities, as well as to aftercare and to supporting children and ado-
lescents with school. Moreover, indirectly affected individuals like parents and siblings
are extensively supported. This takes, for example, the form of a specifically established
home for parents and of pedagogic support. Moreover, the Förderkreis supports clinical
research on cancer.
Projects and tasks of the Förderkreis.
• Klassissimo school project: offers participation in school lessons using Skype
• Bärenstark : support of families at home
• Psychosocial and psychooncological counseling of patients and relatives
• Pedagogic support at the hospital department
• Start-up financing for new positions and financing of specific training of depart-
ments’ staff.
• Financing of hospital clowns and music therapy
• Aftercare
• Support of clinical research on cancer
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B.1.4 Your decision
The donation. You are entrusted with a donation of e15.00, which is sup-
posed to be made to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche
e.V. following today’s experiment. Whether this amount will in fact be trans-
ferred to the Förderkreis at the end of the experiment depends on the deci-
sions that you will make.
Anonymity. No other participant in this experiment can see your decisions. The sub-
sequent analysis of all data is done anonymously, such that all your decisions cannot be
linked to your identity anymore.
You can choose between two options: Option A and Option B. Depending on
which of both options you choose, you can earn different amounts of money.
Additionally, depending on which option you choose, consequences differ for
the donation of e15.00 which was described above.
In what follows, the consequences associated with choices of Option A and Option
B, respectively, will be described.
Option A. If you choose Option A, besides e10.00 for participation you will receive
no additional money at the end of the experiment.
Option B. If you choose Option B, you will additionally receive e10.00 at the end
of the experiment.
As a further consequence, the previously described donation of e15.00 will be
destroyed.
Summary. If you choose Option A, you do not receive an additional payment and
the donation will not be destroyed. If you choose Option B, you additionally receive
e10.00 and the donation is destroyed. The decision rests with you.
You make your decision on a decision screen, which will be shown as soon as you have
answered the control questions on the following screen.
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B.1.5 Control questions
For Option A. How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will the donation be destroyed?  Yes  No
For Option B. How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will the donation be destroyed?  Yes  No
B.1.6 Your decision
Please now choose between Option A and Option B.
I choose:  Option A  Option B
B.1.7 Result
If Option A was chosen: You have decided not to destroy the donation.
Therefore, a donation of e15.00 to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Ju-
gendliche e.V. will be made for you by the BonnEconLab.
If Option B was chosen: You have decided to destroy the donation.
Therefore, no donation will be made.
B.1.8 Experiment 2
Now follows a second experiment. This experiment is the last experiment. Your final
payoff comprises of e10.00 for participation in the experiment, your decision in the first
experiment, and, independently, on how you decide in the second experiment.
The decision in the second experiment is the same as in the first experiment. Thus,
you can again choose between Option A and Option B, i.e., you can decide whether a
donation will be destroyed or not. The donation is again a donation to the Förderkreis
für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche e.V.
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B.2 SimultaneousC
Introduction as in BaselineC
B.2.1 Your decision
Your group. You are together with 7 other participants of today’s experiment in a
group of 8 people. Your group members have been allotted to you at the beginning of
the experiment. You will at no point learn which participant is in your group.
Note: You are making all decisions within this experiment autonomously
and independent of the other members of the group. The consequences of your
decisions can depend on decisions of other group members. On the following screens, all
decisions, alternatives, and consequences will be introduced and explained in detail.
The donation. Your group is entrusted with a donation totaling e120.00,
which is supposed to be made to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und
Jugendliche e.V. following today’s experiment. Whether this amount will in
fact be transferred to the Förderkreis at the end of the experiment, depends
on the decisions that you and the other members of your group will make.
Anonymity. No other participant in this experiment can see your decisions. This is
also true for the other members of your group. The subsequent analysis of all data is done
anonymously, such that all your decisions cannot be linked to your identity anymore.
You can choose between two options: Option A and Option B. Depending on
which of both options you choose, you can earn different amounts of money.
Additionally, depending on which option you choose and which options the
other participants of your group choose independently, consequences differ
for the donation of e120.00 which was described above.
In what follows, the consequences associated with choices of Option A and Option
B, respectively, will be described. The choices and the consequences are the same for all
8 participants in your group.
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Option A. If you choose Option A, besides e10.00 for participation you will receive
no additional money at the end of the experiment.
This holds for all group members: Each group member who chooses Option A re-
ceives no additional money.
Option B. If you choose Option B, you will additionally receive e10.00 at the end
of the experiment.
This holds for all group members: Each group member who chooses Option B addi-
tionally receives e10.00.
As a further consequence, the previously described donation of e120.00 will
be destroyed if at least one of the 8 members of your group chooses Option B.
Thus, if one group member, or if two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight group members
decide for Option B, the donation is destroyed. Only if none of the 8 members of
your group chooses Option B, the donation will not be destroyed.
Summary. If you choose Option A, you do not receive an additional payment. If
you choose Option B, you additionally receive e10.00. Whether the donation to the
Förderkreis is destroyed depends on whether at least one of the 8 members of your group
has chosen Option B.
B.2.2 Decisions of participants in your group
Note: The consequences of your choice do not just depend on you but also on the
decisions of the other 7 members of your group. This holds in particular for the execution
of the donation to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche e.V.: Only
if none of the members of your group has chosen Option B, the donation of
e120.00 is made.
You and the other 7 members of your group decide simultaneously. After all group
members have made their decision, you learn whether the donation will be made.
At the end of today’s experiment, you will also learn how many members of your
group have in total chosen Option A and how many members of your group have in
42
total chosen Option B.
You make your decision on a decision screen, which will be shown as soon as you have
answered the control questions on the following screen.
B.2.3 Control questions
Suppose, no/one other group member chooses / two/six other group members choose
Option B.
You choose Option A: How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will the donation be destroyed?  Yes  No
You choose Option B: How many euros do you receive in addition?
Will the donation be destroyed?  Yes  No
B.2.4 Your decision
Please now choose between Option A and Option B.
I choose:  Option A  Option B
B.2.5 What do you estimate?
How likely is it in your opinion that all other group members have chosen Option A?
Please enter a probability (from 0 to 100 percent): [Slider]
What do you think, how many of the other 7 group members have chosen Option
B? If you estimate the correct number, you will additionally receive e2. Enter a number
between 0 and 7:
B.2.6 Result
If Option A was chosen: You have decided not to destroy the donation.
In your group, at least one participant has decided to destroy the donation. The
donation over e120.00 from you and the other members of your group will therefore not
be made.
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You have not made a correct estimation and therefore do not receive any additional
payoff.
B.2.7 Experiment 2
Now follows a second experiment. This experiment is the last experiment. Your final
payoff comprises of e10.00 for participation in the experiment, your decision in the first
experiment, and, independently, on how you decide in the second experiment.
The decision in the second experiment is the same as in the first experiment. Thus,
you can again choose between Option A and Option B, i.e., you can decide whether a
donation will be destroyed or not. The donation is again a donation to the Förderkreis
für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche e.V.
Please note: You are in the same group of 8 participants as in the first experiment.
B.3 SequentialC
Introduction as in SimultaneousC
B.3.1 Decisions of participants in your group
Note: The consequences of your choice do not just depend on you but also on the
decisions of the other 7 members of your group. This holds in particular for the execution
of the donation to the Förderkreis für krebskranke Kinder und Jugendliche e.V.: Only
if none of the members of your group has chosen Option B, the donation of
e120.00 is made.
You and the other 7 members of your group decide one after the other. Your
position is randomly determined by a computer.
When it is your turn, you will learn whether among the people who have
decided before you, someone has already chosen Option B. You will also learn
your position within the sequence. Moreover, you will learn how many members of
your group have already chosen Option A and how many members of your group have
already chosen Option B. At the end of today’s experiment, you will also learn how
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many members of your group have in total chosen Option A and how many members
of your group have in total chosen Option B.
Please note: If another participant in your group has already decided for Option B
before it was your task, this means that the donation has already been destroyed. Thus
in this case, your decision has no effect any more on whether the donation is made.
Control questions as in SimultaneousC.
B.3.2 Your decision
You are on position 1 in the order of your group. Consequently, no other member in
your group has made a decision yet.
Or:
You are on position 2 in the order of your group. Consequently, 1 group member has
already made a decision.
Of the 1 group members who have decided before you, 1 has decided for Option A and
0 for Option B.
Or:
You are on position 3 in the order of your group. Consequently, 2 group members have
already made a decision.
Of the 2 group members who have decided before you, 1 has decided for Option A and
1 for Option B.
Thus, the donation has already been destroyed.
Please now choose between Option A and Option B.
I choose:  Option A  Option B
Remaining instructions as in SimultaneousC.
B.4 Belief experiment
In the belief experiment, participants read the original instructions (avoiding redundan-
cies, however), learn how many subjects have taken part in the respective treatment, and
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are then asked to answer the following questions.
BaselineCB:
• How likely do you think it is it that a randomly chosen participant of the just
described experiment decides for Option A, i.e., not to destroy the donation?
SimultaneousCB:
• How likely was it for a participant in the experiment to be in a group in which all
other 7 group members choose Option A? (answer in percent)
• How likely do you think it is that the donation is not destroyed in such a group in
the end, i.e., that all 8 group members choose Option A. (answer in percent)
• Please imagine you are in the new situation at the BonnEconlab which was just
described. What do you think: How many of the other 7 members of your group
have decided for Option B, i.e., to destroy the donation?
SequentialCB:
• How likely was it for a participant in this experiment to be in a group in which all
other 7 group members choose Option A? (answer in percent)
• How likely do you think it is that the donation is not destroyed in such a group,
i.e., that all 8 group members choose Option A? (answer in percent)
Please now imagine yourself in the situation of a participant in the described experiment
at the BonnEconLab.
• Imagine, you decide first and choose Option A. How many of the other 7 group
members do think also choose Option A, such that the donation is not destroyed?
(answer in percent)
• Imagine, the member at position 1 in your group chooses Option A. You decide
second and also choose Option A. How likely do you think it is that all further 6
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people in the group also choose Option A, such that the donation is not destroyed?
(answer in percent)
• Imagine, the members at positions 1 to 3 in your group all choose Option A. You
decide as the fourth and also choose Option A. How likely do you think it is that
all further 4 people in the group also choose Option A, such that the donation is
not destroyed? (answer in percent)
• You decide last, i.e., as the eight. How likely do you think it is that all 7 before you
have chosen Option A? (answer in percent)
• Please again imagine yourself in the situation of the described experiment at the
BonnEconLab. You decide first. What do you think: How many of the 7 other
members of your group decide for Option B, i.e., for destroying the donation?
• Now, please imagine that you decide last in your group, i.e., as the eighth. All 7
group members before you have chosen Option A. Would you then choose Option
A or Option B? (unincentivized)
• How likely do you think it is that a participant in the just described situation –
decided last, all group members before have chosen Option A – also has chosen
Option A? (answer in percent)
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Appendix C Robustness Checks
Dependent variable: Option B
OLS Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
SimultaneousC 0.171∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗
(0.0643) (0.166) (0.268)
SequentialC 0.317∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗
(0.0723) (0.206) (0.340)
Female -0.0583 -0.164 -0.267
(0.0451) (0.125) (0.209)
Math grade -0.0102 -0.0287 -0.0467
(0.00690) (0.0194) (0.0316)
Big 5 – openness -0.0140∗∗ -0.0396∗∗ -0.0641∗∗
(0.00653) (0.0180) (0.0300)
Big 5 – conscientiousness 0.00729 0.0204 0.0333
(0.00725) (0.0205) (0.0333)
Big 5 – extraversion 0.00475 0.0135 0.0218
(0.00543) (0.0149) (0.0248)
Big 5 – agreeableness -0.00399 -0.0112 -0.0178
(0.00788) (0.0215) (0.0356)
Big 5 – neuroticism 0.00433 0.0118 0.0198
(0.00608) (0.0165) (0.0275)
Constant 0.580∗∗ 0.256 0.404
(0.242) (0.661) (1.095)
Observations 481 481 481
R2 0.091
AIC 650.9 621.2 621.3
Table 4: OLS estimates of treatment effects in Charity experiment. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level for subjects in SequentialC (30 groups; in total 271 clusters).
∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
48
Dependent variable: Option B
OLS Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
BaselineC, round 2 0.00837 0.0217 0.0348
(0.0712) (0.184) (0.295)
SimultaneousC, round 2 0.125∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.551∗∗
(0.0583) (0.157) (0.257)
SequentialC, round 2 0.142∗ 0.506∗ 0.888∗
(0.0746) (0.276) (0.492)
BaselineC 0.397∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗ -0.419∗∗
(0.0447) (0.116) (0.186)
SimultaneousC 0.583∗∗∗ 0.210∗ 0.336∗
(0.0452) (0.115) (0.185)
SequentialC 0.721∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.0573) (0.170) (0.284)
Observations 920 920 920
R2 0.709
AIC 1115.3 1065.5 1065.5
Table 5: Difference estimates for second round effects in the charity experiments within
each treatment. Standard errors are clustered at the group level for the second round
of SimultaneousC and for both rounds of SequentialC (in total 395 clusters). ∗ p < 0.1;
∗∗ p < 0.05; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Dependent variable:
Option B in round 2
SimultaneousC SequentialC
(1) (2)
Option B in round 1 0.324∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.0989) (0.0783)







Table 6: Standard errors are clustered at the group level. ∗ p < 0.1; ∗∗ p < 0.05;
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